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1. Introduction 
With the rapid development and comprehensive application of network technology, 
network security problems gradually appear serious. Traditional firewall technologies can’t 
provide sufficient security protection against various attacks and intrusions (Anderson, 
1980), while intrusion detection systems (IDS) are faced with compromise between false 
alarms and false positives (Denning, 1987). In this chapter, we investigate intrusion 
detection and intrusion prevention in high speed network, introduce related technology and 
our research results. 
1.1 The information system and system security 
Information system is an integrated set of components for collecting, storing, processing, 
and communicating information. Information systems are more than just computer 
programs. Though information and communications technologies are playing an increasing 
role in meeting organisations’ information needs, an information system is a much more 
general concept. It refers to the wider systems of people, data and activities, both computer-
based and manual, that effectively gather, process, store and disseminate organisations’ 
information. Of course, system security is essential for information system. In another 
words, security is the most reliable foundation for information system. 
1.2 The actual condition of information system security 
With the development of Internet, the world economy has been deeply communed together.  
The nation is just like a huge network computer, and computer network has been the 
foundation and life vein of a nation’s economy. As the entire society increasingly relies on 
network infrastructures, network security also changes for the worse seriously. It is very 
difficult for traditional security policies or mechanisms (such as authentication, 
cryptography and firewall) to prevent network attacks. The whole society needs new 
technology to solve those problems. 
The openness of the system network, the security hole of the network protocol, the defects 
of the software…Those drawbacks make the network security worse than worse. According 
to the recently research and report, people found the details and data of network attack 
easily. The high occurrence probability makes the problem urgent (Allen et al., 2000). 
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Cases are known, the network security is the most reliable foundation for network 
applications. Every country, for commercial or military purposes, spared a lot to study 
network security. Research on this issue  
Although there are various measures to protect safety, they are not the keys to all kinds of 
attack. For instance: 
1. A perfect design of software safety is impossible. 
2. Encryption technology itself has some problems, and those shortcomings may lead to 
keylogger activities. Moreover, people may misunderstand the arithmetic. 
3. The security hole of the network protocol. 
4. The contradiction between the availability and the safety is always one of those 
contradictions running through the long developing process of computer technology. 
5. The complex security system is usually difficult to configure. The blander of wrong 
configuration will leave some hidden danger. 
6. The system log and the audit have massive data. They need automatic mode to work 
with those information. 
7. Staff members may abuse the safety system. 
This chapter presents the corresponding research work on the intrusion detection and 
intrusion prevention in large-scale high-speed network environment and is organized as 
follows: firstly, a distributed extensible intrusion prevention system is provided, then 
various packet selection models for intrusion detection systems based-on sampling are 
illustrated, again the design and implementation of a high-speed traffic collection platform 
based-on sampling on FPGAs and the research of trusted communication protocol for 
intrusion prevention system are presented, last we draw concclusions. 
2. DXIPS: A distributed extensible intrusion prevention system 
2.1 Related technology 
2.1.1 Snort_inline 
The Snort_inline IPS is a modified version of the famous Snort IDS. It receives packets sent 
from the Netfilter firewall with the help of the lipipq library1, compares them with Snort 
signature rules and tags them as drop if they match a rule, then finally sends them back to 
Netfilter where the Snort_Inline tagged packets are dropped. 
There are 5 available default actions in Snort, alert, log, pass, activate , and dynamic: 
1. alert-generate an alert using the selected alert method, and then log the packet 
2. log-log the packet 
3. pass - ignore the packet  
4. activate - alert and then turn on another dynamic rule  
5. dynamic - remain idle until activated by an activate rule , then act as a log rule  
There are three rule options more than Snort’s: 
1. Drop – The drop rule tells iptables to drop the packet and log it via usual snort means  
2. Sdrop – The sdrop rule tells iptables to drop the packet. Nothing is logged. 
                                                                          
1 Libipq library is a development library for iptables userspace packet queuing 
www.intechopen.com
 Intrusion Detection and Prevention in High Speed Network 55 
3. Reject – The reject rule type tells iptables to drop the packet; log it via usual snort 
means; and send a TCP reset if the protocol is TCP or an ICMP port unreachable if the 
protocol is UDP. 
2.1.2 Netfilter 
Along with the development of the technology used in Linux firewall, Netfilter comes into 
being. It is well known that Netfilter is a framework that provides hook handling within the 
Linux kernel for intercepting and manipulating network packets. 
Netfilter is made up of five hook functions towards IPV4, IPV6, and IPX. The identifiers of 
all hooks for each supported protocol are defined in the protocol-specific header file. The 
following five hooks are defined for IP Version 4 in <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>: 
NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING (default value is 0): incoming packets pass this hook in the ip_rcv() 
(linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c) function before they are processed by the routing code  
NF_IP_LOCAL_IN (default value is 1): all incoming packets addressed to the local computer 
pass this hook in the function ip_local_deliver()  
NF_IP_FORWARD (default value is 2): all incoming packets not addressed to the local 
computer pass this hook in the function ip_forward()  
NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT (default value is 3): all outgoing packets created in the local computer 
pass this hook in the function ip_build_and_send_pkt()  
NF_IP_POST_ROUTING (default value is 4): this hook in the ip_finish_output() function 
represents the last chance to access all outgoing (forwarded or locally created) packets 
before they leave the computer over a network device  
There are five return values in the hook functions: 
NF_DROP (default value is 0): The active rules list processing is stopped, and the packet is 
dropped  
NF_ACCEPT (default value is 1): The packet is passed to the next packet filter function in 
the rules list. Once the end of the list has been reached, the packet is released by okfn() 
for further processing  
NF_STOLEN (default value is 2): The packet filter function withholds the packet for further 
processing, so that the active rules list processing is stopped. In contrast to NF_DROP, 
however, the packet does not have to be explicitly dropped  
NF_QUEUE (default value is 3): The function nf_queue() (net/core/netfilter.c) puts the 
packet in a queue from which it can be removed and processed (e.g., by a user space 
program). Subsequently, nf_reinject() has to be invoked to return the packet to the 
Linux kernel for further processing by netfilter  
NF_REPEAT (default value is 4): In contrast to NF_ACCEPT, rather than a continuation of 
processing at the next packet-filter function, the current filter function is invoked again  
2.1.3 Iptables 
Iptables is used to set up, maintain, and inspect the tables of IP packet filter rules in the 
Linux kernel. Several different tables may be defined. Each table contains a number of built-
in chains and may also contain user-defined chains.  
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A firewall rule specifies criteria for a packet, and a target. If the packet does not match, the 
next rule in the chain is the examined; if it does match, then the next rule is specified by the 
value of the target, which can be the name of a user-defined chain or one of the special 
values ACCEPT, DROP, QUEUE, or RETURN.  
ACCEPT means to let the packet through. DROP means to drop the packet on the floor. 
QUEUE means to pass the packet to userspace. (How the packet can be received by a 
userspace process differs by the particular queue handler. 2.4.x and 2.6.x kernels up to 2.6.13 
include the ip_queue queue handler. Kernels 2.6.14 and later additionally include the 
nfnetlink_queue queue handler. Packets with a target of QUEUE will be sent to queue 
number '0' in this case. Please also see the NFQUEUE target as described later in this man 
page.) RETURN means stop traversing this chain and resume at the next rule in the previous 
(calling) chain. If the end of a built-in chain is reached or a rule in a built-in chain with target 
RETURN is matched, the target specified by the chain policy determines the fate of the 
packet.  
2.2 Architecture of DXIPS 
DXIPS is a distributed network IPS based on the combination of Snort_inline and Netfilter 
firewall configured by IPtables, and it provides the ability to detect malicious network 
traffic, drop or reject attack packets, and perform intrusion detection and prevention on 4-7 
layers of network protocol. 
Hierarchical structure is applied to the architecture of DXIPS, which consists of three layers: 
Intrusion prevention layer: monitor the network traffic passing by and perform intrusion 
detection and prevention. 
Server layer: collect log data and save to readable format. 
Control layer: analysis console and perform data display. 
 
Fig. 1. Architecture of DXIPS 
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2.3 Construction and implementation of DXIPS 
DXIPS is composed of four modules: intrusion prevention module, log record module, 
central control module and communication module. These four modules coordinate with 
each other and perform intrusion prevention in distributed network environment. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Construction of DXIPS 
Intrusion prevention module runs on intrusion prevention layer, and it is responsible for 
capturing packets, intrusion detection and prevention. This module is to be deployed at the 
crucial position of network, such as the network link between intranet and extranet, thus all 
the packets are to be monitored. This module is based on the combination of Snort_inline 
and Netfilter firewall configured by IPtables, and consists of three submodules such as 
packets capture, packets detection and response. 
Log record module runs on server layer and aims for log collection and formatting. The 
collected logs include intrusion detection log generated by Snort_inline and firewall log by 
the configuration of IPtables. 
Central control module is the core of the whole system and runs on control layer. It is in 
charge of coordinating other modules and performing management operations such as the 
configuration of IPS, management of log server, data analysis and load balancing. 
Communication module has the ability to provide secure and reliable communication 
channels between modules. 
2.3.1 Intrusion prevention module 
Intrusion prevention module is to be deployed at the crucial position of network and needs 
the ability of routing, that is, packets with correct route information should be delivered 
from source address to destination address. Thus normal communication between intranet 
and extranet is to be done. The part of function of routing in DXIPS makes use of the default 
route module in Linux system, and the command is as follows: 
“echo 1>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_ forward” 
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When packets are captured by intrusion prevention module, the function of IP forward is 
active, and kernel will deliver packets based on address information of packets and routing 
table information. 
1. Packets capture 
Packets capture procedure is to pass packets from kernel space to user space, and includes 
event generator, Netfilter hook program, IPtables, ip_queue kernel module and netlink 
interface. 
During the procedure of packets capture, intrusion prevention module looks on the filtered 
packets by Netfilter firewall configured by IPtables as data source. It may reduce the 
amount of packets to be detected by performing intrusion detection on the specific traffic 
with regard to security policy. IPtables, which is a packet filter firewall running on data link 
layer and network layer, may firstly filter packets according to security policy, then pass the 
filtered packets to Snort_inline and perform intrusion detection. 
Specific types of packets are to be accepted by Snort_inline according to the configuration of 
IPtables. For example, SMTP traffic is to be monitored by Snort_inline according to the 
configuration of IPtables. The following parts present the commands:  
“iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p tcp --dport 25 -j 
QUEUE” 
“iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT” 
“iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 25 -m state --state NEW -j QUEUE” 
2. Packets detection 
Packets detection procedure is to perform intrusion detection corresponding with rules set, 
and includes event analyzer, libipq library, Snort_inline and rules set. 
Intrusion prevention module captures packets according to security policy and parses the 
structure of packet based on protocol specifications, then executes data formatting and 
performs string matching on packets with rules set.  
Fig.3 illustrates the packets detection procedure. Snort_inline executes initialization based 
on command line parameters, and working mode is specified by parameters. Then two 
dimensional linked lists are constructed based on rules by parsing rules library. Again, 
Snort_inline performs intrusion detection on packets by calling the function “ProcessPacket( 
)” after packets are accessed cyclically from structure “ip_queue”. Function “ProcessPacket( 
)” firstly executes protocol parsing and set structure “Packet”, then calls detection function 
“Detect( )” to perform detection according to rule linked lists in certain turn, lastly returns 
detection results. 
Corresponding response actions based on packet detection results may be executed. There 
are 5 available default actions in Snort, alert, log, pass, activate, and dynamic. In addition, 
there are additional options which include drop, sdrop and reject in Snort_inline. Action 
“drop” is to make IPtables drop the packet and log the packet; action “sdrop” is to make 
IPtables drop the packet but does not log it; action “reject” is to make IPtables drop the 
packet, log it, and then send a TCP reset if the protocol is TCP or an ICMP port unreachable 
message if the protocol is UDP. 
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Fig. 3. Flow diagram of packets detection 
2.3.2 Log record module 
Log record module is applied to record and audit the time when event happened and 
corresponding information of subjects and objects, and it aims for providing sufficient 
information for detailed analysis of security events later. 
Log record module collects log of intrusion prevention module, saves it to log server, and 
provides analysis data for security policy specified by central control module. The collected 
logs include intrusion detection log generated by Snort_inline and firewall log by the 
configuration of IPtables. 
Snort_inline will generate corresponding log based on specific parameter of rule action such 
as alert, log, drop and reject. The default directory of log files is “/var/log/snort”. 
The Netfilter firewall log may be accessed with LOG target of IPtables. To make use of LOG 
target, ipt_LOG module is needed to be loaded as follows: 
“/sbin/modprobe ipt_LOG” 
For instance, all the connection information passing by may be recorded as follows: 
“#iptables -A FORWARD -j LOG” 
LOG target is dedicated for recording detailed packet information such as IP header and 
other useful information. The default directory of log of IPtables is “/var/log/message”, 
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There are three manners for log server to collect intrusion detection log of Snort_inline and 
firewall log of Netfilter configured by IPtables: 
All the nodes of intrusion prevention module directly interact with log server 
This can be done by outputting log records directly to log database with Snort_inline output 
plugin and LOG target of IPtables. The defect of this manner is to improve the system 
overhead in that intrusion prevention module needs to execute log operations as well as 
perform intrusion detection and prevention. Additionally, this manner compromises the 
extensibility of the whole system for the duplicated implementation of log recording. 
Log server accesses logs saved in every intrusion prevention nodes at regular time 
Though this manner decreases the overhead of intrusion prevention module, it 
compromises real time performance of the whole system. Log server can’t get log 
information in time, thus central control module is unable to monitor the protected network 
in real time. 
Apply specialized log collection daemon  
These daemons are responsible for receiving and dispatching logs of various intrusion 
prevention nodes and saving to log server in distributed network environment. Compared 
to the preceding manners, this manner shortens handling time, reduces system overhead, 
and provides better extensibility. 
2.3.3 Central control module 
Central control module is the core of the whole system, in charge of coordinating various 
modules, and conducts centralized management. It locates at central position of the whole 
system, and connects with intrusion prevention module and log record module. The main 
functions of central control module include: 
Customized policy: central control module is able to establish corresponding policies based 
on intrusion detection and prevention logs. Log management: central control module can 
analyze intrusion prevention logs and firewall logs saved in log server in real time and 
provide corresponding statistical information. 
System management: central control module has the ability to manage various intrusion 
prevention nodes by console, such as dynamical management of intrusion detection rules 
and firewall rules, management of log server, network traffic statistics and load balancing. 
2.3.4 Communication module 
It is an important component for secure and reliable communication among various 
modules of DXIPS. This module mainly refers to the communication among central control 
module, intrusion prevention module and log record module. 
To achieve the interoperation among modules, there is a need of general communication 
protocol, which contributes to simplifying the management of DXIPS. For example, if central 
control module is to disable the intrusion prevention function of certain node, a control 
message is sent to this node by console, and then this node returns an acknowledgement 
message after it quits normally. 
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The general communication protocol is derived from standard TCP/IP protocol with farther 
encapsulation, and it is an application layer protocol. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Customized protocol unit 
Customized protocol header is composed of version, type and total length. Type field 
specifies the type of message such as control message, log message or acknowledgement 
message according to specific functions. Meanwhile, type field specifies the format of 
data. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Format of customized protocol header 
The format of payload field varies according to type field. The format of a sample log 
message is as follows: 
 
 
Fig. 6. Format of payload field of a sample log message 
Customized communication protocol provides the better extensibility for later new function 
to be updated or new communication needs. Also it supports encryption manners for secure 
and reliable communication. 
2.4 Deployment of DXIPS 
DXIPS provides flexible deployment strategies and better extensibility. It can be expediently 
deployed in distributed network environment corresponding with various securities 
prevention needs, and presents a comprehensive protection. 
2.4.1 Border prevention deployment 
With the rapid development of Internet, great deals of business applications rely on Internet. 
However, there are various security threats, such as worms, computer viruses, spywares 
and DDoS attacks, towards the entrance to the Internet of an intranet due to the openability 
of Internet. 
To minimize external network security risks, intrusion prevention module may sit on the 
entrance to Internet, examine traffic, and block malicious or suspect code in real time. As 
shown in figure 7. 
Header Payload 
Version Type Total length 
Node 
ID 
Log 
level 
Log 
time 
Message 
length 
Message 
content 
www.intechopen.com
 Security Enhanced Applications for Information Systems 62
 
Fig. 7. Border prevention deployment 
2.4.2 Key zones prevention deployment 
External security threats, such as worms, computer viruses, spywares, may be introduced 
into intranet by inconsciently users. To minimize internal network security risks, intrusion 
prevention module may sit on the entrance to office zone and key server zone, block 
malicious traffic in real time, filter worms, computer viruses and spywares from office zone, 
and protect the key network server. As shown in Fig. 8. 
2.4.3 Hybrid prevention deployment 
To minimize external and internal network security risks simultaneously, intrusion 
prevention module may sit on the entrance to key network link, block malicious traffic in 
real time, and protect the key network resources. 
Meanwhile, intrusion prevention module may sit on the entrance to key network link in 
bypass mode, which can be treated as intrusion detection system, and performs analysis and 
detections on intranet. As shown in figure 9. 
2.5 Related work 
There are various research and commercial work on the design and implementation of IPS. 
Tan and Weinsberg attempt to improve string-matching algorithms for intrusion detection 
and prevention on large-scale high-speed network traffic; Drinic (Drinic & Kirovski, 2004) 
and Weaver (Weaver et al., 2007) present the hardware implementation of IPS based on field 
programmable gate arrays; Green uses a generic and reliable model to anticipate future  
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Fig. 8. Key zone prevention deployment 
 
Fig. 9. Hybrid prevention deployment 
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attack scenarios; Uppuluri provides a practical approach to detect and prevent race 
condition attacks (Uppuluri et al., 2005). What’s more, there are many commercial IPS 
products available such as TippingPoint IPS, ISS IPS, Cisco IPS and NetKeeper IPS, and 
these representative products are online, network-based solution, designed to accurately 
identify, classify, and stop malicious traffic, including worms, spyware/adware, network 
viruses, and application abuse. 
2.6 Summary 
This subsection presents the design and implementation of DXIPS, a distributed extensible 
intrusion prevention system, which is composed of intrusion prevention module, central 
control module, log record module and communication module. And DXIPS provides an 
extensible architecture of intrusion detection and prevention in distributed network 
environment. 
3. Packet selection model for intrusion detection system based-on sampling 
3.1 Packet selection model 
There are many sampling model of statistics, while there are few applied to computer 
network especially high speed network. For real time demands of network packets 
processing, packet selection model have to conform to high precision and simple 
applications. In this paper, systematic sampling, Poisson sampling and stratified sampling 
methods are applied to network packets selection. 
3.1.1 Systematic sampling  
Systematic sampling describes the process of selecting the starting points and the duration 
of the selection intervals according to a deterministic function. This can be for instance the 
periodic selection of every n-th element of a trace but also the selection of all packets that 
arrive at pre-defined points in time. Even if the selection process does not follow a periodic 
function (e.g. if the time between the sampling intervals varies over time) we consider this 
as systematic sampling as long as the selection is deterministic.  
The use of systematic sampling always involves the risk of biasing the results. If the 
systematics in the sampling process resembles systematics in the observed stochastic process 
(occurrence of the characteristic of interest in the network), there is a high probability that 
the estimation will be biased. Systematics (e.g. periodic repetition of an event) in the 
observed process might not be known in advance.   
3.1.2 Poisson sampling 
Poisson sampling is an example of random additive sampling. In this sampling, samples are 
separated by independent, randomly generated intervals that have a common statistical 
distribution. In general, Poisson sampling avoids synchronization effects and yields an 
unbiased estimate of the property being sampled.  
If sampling function obeys an exponential distribution with rate λ, that is ( ) 1 tF t e   , then 
the arrival of new samples cannot be predicted (and, again, the sampling is unbiased). 
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Furthermore, the sampling is asymptotically unbiased even if the act of sampling affects the 
network's state. Such sampling is referred to as Poisson sampling. The sample size during 
interval T obeys Poisson distribution with rate λ at which the singleton measurements will 
on average be made, that is ( ) ( ) !k TkP T T k e k
  . 
To generate Poisson sampling intervals, one first determines the rate λ at which the 
singleton measurements will on average be made (e.g., for an average sampling interval of 
30 seconds, we have λ= 1/30, if the units of time are seconds). One then generates a series of 
exponentially-distributed (pseudo) random numbers E1, E2,…, En  The first measurement is 
made at time E1, the next at time E1+E2, and so on. 
3.1.3 Stratified sampline 
Before sampling, the whole population is first divided into mutually exclusive subgroups, 
called stratum. Let N be the number of population unit, L be the number of strata and 
N1,N2,…,NL represent the size of each stratum, then
1
L
h
h
N N

 . If the sample is taken 
randomly from each stratum, the procedure is known as stratified random sampling. 
For stratified sampling, there are some factors supposed to determine such as stratified 
characteristics, stratum number, stratum border, sample size allocation and variance within 
strata. The concrete discussions of these factors are as follows: 
Stratified characteristics are the base of stratified sampling. Network packets may be 
stratified by protocol type, TTL or total length field of IP header. The selection of stratified 
characteristics relates to the type of intrusions. As a example of ICMP sweep attack, the 
characteristics of this attack is the generation of lots of ping packets with light payload 
suddenly, then the proportion of ICMP packets ascends and the average length of packets 
decreases. If the packet length is selected for stratification, sound detection results are to be 
achieved. 
From [12], the gain of stratified sampling increases with the more stratum number; when the 
stratum number increases to 3 from 2, the gain won’t improve too much; the gain will 
appear to decrease with the increase of stratum number; when the stratum number is 
beyond 4, the gain of stratified sampling tend to be stable. 
The determination of stratum border is based on the stratified strategy. Sample with similar 
characteristics may be classified into certain stratum in stratified sampling, which leads to 
the less variance in certain stratum. The simplest way to determine stratum border is based 
on the type of packets such as TCP, UDP and ICMP, and stratum border is naturally 
determined by protocol type of IP header of packet. If packet is classified into certain 
stratum according to the total length field, the stratum border is determined by the variable 
interval of the actual value Li ( min maxiL L L  ). If every stratum is based on Li, it is obvious 
that this is impractical. In this paper, there are hundreds kinds of packets related to total 
length field. If every stratum is based on total length, the efficiency of this implementation is 
too bad. So we make use of the optimum stratified method based on the cumulate square 
root of stratified variable distribution [13], shown as Table 1. 
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Total length 
of packet 
Number f  Cumulate f  
L1-L2 Mi 1M  1M  
L2-L3 M2 2M  1M + 2M  
… … … … 
… … … … 
Ln-2-Ln-1 Mn-1 1nM   1M + 2M +…+ 1iM   
Ln-1-Ln Mn nM  
1
n
i
i
M

  
Table 1. Cumulate square root table 
Let R=
1
n
i
i
M

 , if the stratum number is 5, then a new stratum is generated at intervals of 
R/5, and so the four stratum border point is to make the value of cumulate f  closed to the 
following value: R/5, 2R/5, 3R/5, 4R/5, and these four values are stratum border points of 
stratified sampling. 
For stratified sampling, it is supposed to solve the problem of sample size allocation in strata 
given fixed population size. Because the precision of stratified random sampling relates to 
sample size allocation and variance within strata, the stratification or sample size allocation 
would affect the efficiency of stratified sampling directly. Generally, proportional allocation 
is the better if the means between strata vary greatly, while optimum allocation is the better 
if the standard deviations between strata vary greatly. In practical sample procedure, we 
tend to select the proportional allocation method because optimum allocation is only toward 
to single target variable. In fact, there are usually more target variables. The optimum 
allocation of single variable may be not proper to other variables. Proportional allocation 
refers to allocate the size within strata based on each stratum weight. 
What’s more, sampling strategy in a stratum is also to be determined. In practice, both 
systematic sampling and random sampling are to be applied. 
3.2 Experiments and discussion 
To test the performance of different sampling strategies, we conduct experiments in our 
campus network. The network traffic is captured by a host linked to the router of a C class 
subnet. Experimental results are shown in Figure 10 and Table 2 as follows. 
 
 Population 
Systematic 
sampling 
Poisson sampling 
Stratified 
sampling 
UDP 82.47% 82.14% 82.85% 82.5% 
TCP 11.87% 11.92% 11.94% 11.73% 
ICMP 5.66% 5.95% 5.21% 5.77% 
Table 2. Packet type proportion 
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Fig. 10. Packet length distribution curve 
Figure 10 is the packet length distribution curve, and table 2 shows the proportion of 
different type of packets in population and separate sampling strategies. From figure 1, it 
can be seen that the distribution of packet length in Poisson sampling and stratified 
sampling conforms to the distribution of packet length in population. Though there is a little 
diversity between the distribution of packet length in systematic sampling and the 
distribution of population, this diversity is also in the acceptive scope of precision. Table 2 
shows the proportion of different kind of packet with diverse sampling strategies accords 
with population and these sampling strategies are applicable. 
In practice, sampling may also be applied to intrusion detection by estimating the value of 
certain measure in population. The following parts briefly present the relative efforts with 
the average length of packets as the measure. 
Assume the mean of population X is  , variance is 2 . Let X1, X2, X3, …, Xn are the sample 
of population X, then     2, /E X D X n   , and  2~ ,X N   , so
1
1 n
i
i
X X
n 
  also obeys 
normal distribution, that is  2~ , /X N n   [14]. 
For given confidence 1  , let X1, X2, X3, …, Xn are the sample of population  2,N   , X  
and 2S  are the corresponding mean and variance of sample, then 
  ~ 1
/
X
t n
S n
   (1) 
and right side distribution t(n-1) doesn’t rely on any other parameters, then  
 /2 /2{ ( 1) ( 1)} 1
/
X
P t n t n
S n
 
         (2) 
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that is  
/2 /2{ ( 1) ( 1)} 1
S S
p X t n X t n
n n
           
so the confidence interval of  with given confidence 1  is   
 /2( ( 1))
S
X t n
n
   (3) 
The measured value of average length of packet with systematic sampling is 134.0631, 
standard variance is 73.607 and total number of packet n is 92647. From the distribution 
table of t, the value of t(n-1) appears to be a constant when n run to infinite.  
We estimate the average packet length of population by systematic sampling and ensure the 
confidence of this length is 95%. From (3), we get the confidence interval of average packet 
length of population with confidence 95% is (134.0634  0.47). If the error is no more  
than 0.94, the confidence of this error is 95% considering any value in this interval as the  
estimate of packet average length in population. From preceding experimental results, the  
value of average length of packet in population is 134.4601, which is in the interval of  
(134.0634  0.47). 
It can be seen from experiments that the average length of packet in normal traffic tends to 
be stable. When ICMP sweep attack appears, there are lots of packets with short length, and 
average length of packet is obviously various [15]. So the average length may be considered 
as the measure to detect intrusions. 
With the change of user behavior and network topology, the characteristic of network may 
also vary. So the data related to the behavior of certain network during some time may be 
chosen to characterize the normal characteristics rather than all the passed data. Assume the 
granularity of time is T, Li is the average length of packet in the ith time interval. Anomaly 
actions are to be detected by comparing current sampled value and the value of preceding i-
1th time interval. That is, if current average length of packet is in the scope of normal value 
calculated by preceding sampled data, there is no intrusion, and then the preceding data can 
be updated. Otherwise, there appears intrusion, and current data can’t be updated. 
3.3 Summary 
With the rapid development of network technology, there are more severe challenges to 
information security, and IDS has been an indispensable part of computer security. 
However, there appears packet drop for IDS especially in a high speed network 
environment. In this chaper, we apply packet selection model based on sampling methods 
of statistics to the procedure of data collection of IDS. Experiment results show that selected 
sample (packets) can be applied to detection and analysis for IDS in the scope of certain 
precision. In short, our method has the following advantages: firstly, this method 
exceedingly strengthens the processing performance of IDS by the means of replacing 
dropping packets passively with sampling packets actively especially in the large-scale 
high-speed network; secondly, this method has better expansibility, and various sampling 
strategies may be applied corresponding to different implementation. 
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4. STAMP -A high-speed traffic collection platform based on sampling on 
FPGAs 
4.1 Design and implementation of STAMP 
In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of a uniform high-speed traffic 
collection platform for intrusion detection/prevention based on sampling on FPGAs. To 
achieve this goal, HSTCP’s architecture integrates elephant flow identification and adaptive 
elephant flow sampling into a FPGA prototyping board, which is a gigabit Ethernet network 
interface card with open hardware and software specifications. 
A flow is a sequence of packets that share certain common properties (called flow 
specification) and have some temporal locality as observed at a given measurement point. 
Depending on the application and measurement objectives, flows may be defined in various 
manners such as source/destination IP addresses, port numbers, protocols, or combinations 
thereof. They can be further grouped and aggregated into various granularity levels such as 
network prefixes or autonomous systems. In this paper, we present flow statistics and 
experimental results using flows of 5 tuple (source/destination IP addresses, port numbers, 
and the protocol number) with a 60-s timeout value as our basic flow definition. 
As many measurement-based studies have revealed, flow statistics exhibit strong heavy-tail 
behaviors in various networks (including the Internet). This characteristic is often referred to 
as the elephant and mice phenomenon (aka the vital few and trivial many rule), i.e., most 
flows (mice flows) only have a small number of packets, while a very few flows (elephant 
flows) have a large number of packets. A noticeable attribute of elephant flows is that they 
contribute a large portion of the total traffic volume despite being relatively few in the 
number of flows. In this paper, we define an elephant flow as a flow that contributes more 
than 0.1% of all unsampled packets. 
The elephant flow identification module maintains an array of counters for every flow. 
Counters at certain index would contain the total number of packets belonging to all of the 
flows colliding into this index. 
At intervals of certain time (60 s), the adaptive elephant flow sampling module would adjust 
the sampled rate according to the traffic load changes in the identified elephant flow. The 
sampled rate is based on the packet count. An AR model is used for predicting the number 
of packets of a certain elephant flow in the next time interval.  
HSTCP is built on the Avnet Virtex-II Pro Development Board shown in Figure 11. This 
FPGA prototyping board includes all of the components necessary for a gigabit Ethernet 
network interface with embedded processors and on-board memory.  
 
Fig. 11. HSTCP PCI card 
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4.1.1 Elephant flow identification 
Identifying elephant flows is very important in developing effective and efficient traffic 
engineering schemes. In addition, obtaining the statistics of these flows is also very useful 
for network operation and management. On the other hand, with the rapid growth of the 
link speed in recent years, packet sampling has become a very attractive and scalable means 
to measure flow statistics. 
To identify elephant flows, traditionally we have to collect all packets in the concerned 
network, and then extract their flow statistics. As many previous studies have indicated, 
however, such an approach lacks scalability. For very high speed links (say, OC-192+), 
directly measuring all flows is beyond the capability of measurement equipments (i.e., the 
requirements for CPU power, memory/storage capacity, and access speed are 
overwhelming). 
 
Fig. 12. Elephant flow volume estimation. 
Because flows are dynamic in their arrival time and active duration, it is very hard to define 
a sampling interval that is valid for all elephant flows, while allowing us to adjust the 
sampling rate in accordance with the changing traffic condition to ensure estimation 
accuracy. We tackle this problem by using stratified sampling. Sequenced predetermined, 
nonoverlapping time blocks are called strata. In each block, systematic count - based 
sampling is applied, that is every Cth packet of the parent process is deterministically 
selected for sampling, starting from some starting sampling point, and other packets will be 
directly dropped. At the end of each block, flow statistics are estimated. Then, naturally, a 
flow’s volume is summarized into a single estimation record at the end of the last time block 
enclosing the flow. Notice that from each flow’s point of view, its duration is divided or 
stratified in a fixed time. The predetermined time blocks enable us to estimate the flow 
volume without knowing dynamic flow arrival times and their durations while adjusting 
the sampling rate according to dynamical traffic changes.  
The elephant flow identification module maintains an array of counters. Upon the arrival of 
a packet, its flow specification is hashed to generate an index into this array, and the counter 
at this index is incremented by 1. Collisions due to hashing might cause two or more flow 
labels to be hashed to same indices. Counters at such an index would contain the total 
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number of packets belonging to all of the flows colliding into this index. We do not have any 
explicit mechanisms to handle collisions as any such mechanism would impose additional 
processing and storage overheads that are unsustainable at high speeds. This makes the 
encoding process very simple and fast. Efficient implementations of hash functions allow 
the online streaming module to operate at speeds as high as OC-768 (40 Gbps) without 
missing any packets. 
Internet traffic is known to have the property that a few flows can be very large, while most 
other flows are small. Thus, the counters in our array need to be large enough to 
accommodate the largest flow size . On the other hand, the counter size needs to be made as 
small as possible to save precious SRAM. Recent work on efficient implementation of 
statistical counters provides an ideal mechanism to balance these two conflicting 
requirements, which we will leverage in our scheme. For each counter in the array, say 32 
bits wide, this mechanism uses 32 bits of slow memory (DRAM) to store a large counter and 
maintains a smaller counter, say 7 bits wide, in fast memory (SRAM). As the counters in 
SRAM exceed a certain threshold value (say 64) due to increments, it increments the value of 
the corresponding counter in DRAM by 64 and resets the counter in SRAM to 0. There is a 2-
bit per counter overhead that covers the cost of keeping track of counters above the 
threshold, bringing the total number of bits per counter in SRAM to 9. For suitable choices 
of parameters, this scheme allows an efficient implementation of wide counters using a 
small amount of SRAM. This technique can be applied seamlessly to implementing the array 
of counters required in our data streaming module. In our algorithm 6, the size of each 
counter in SRAM is 9 bits and in DRAM is 32. Also, since the scheme in [23] incurs very little 
extra computational and memory access overhead, our streaming algorithm running on top 
of it can still achieve high speeds such as OC-768. 
4.1.2 Adaptive elephant flow sampling 
Traffic measurement and monitoring serves as the basis for a wide range of IP network 
operations and engineering tasks such as troubleshooting, accounting and usage profiling, 
routing weight configuration, load balancing, capacity planning, etc. Traditionally, traffic 
measurement and monitoring is done by capturing every packet traversing a router 
interface or a link. With today’s high-speed (e.g., gigabit or terabit) links, such an approach 
is no longer feasible due to the excessive overheads it incurs on line-cards or routers. As a 
result, packet sampling has been suggested as a scalable alternative to address this problem. 
In this paper, we have investigated two sampling techniques, namely, simple random 
packet sampling and adaptive weighted packet sampling. 
Given the dynamic nature of network traffic, static sampling does not always ensure the 
accuracy of estimation, and tends to oversample at peak periods when efficiency and 
timeliness are most critical. More generally, static random sampling techniques do not take 
traffic dynamics into account; thus they cannot guarantee that the sampling error in each 
block falls within a prescribed error tolerance level. 
In other words, under some traffic loads, static count-based sampling may be poorly suited 
to the monitoring task. During periods of idle activity or low network loads, a big sampling 
count provides sufficient accuracy at a minimal overhead. However, bursts of high activity 
require a small sampling count to accurately measure the network status at the expense of 
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increased sampling overhead. To address this issue, adaptive sampling techniques can be 
employed to dynamically adjust the sampling count and optimize accuracy and overhead. 
In this paper, we investigated adaptive sampling techniques to intelligently sample the 
incoming elephant flows. A key element in adaptive sampling is the prediction of future 
behavior based on the observed samples. The AR model described in this section predicts 
the packet count of the next sampling interval based on the past samples. Inaccurate 
predictions indicate a change in the elephant flow load and require an increased/decreased 
sampling count to determine the new value. 
In any case, we cannot accurately choose the sampling count when the population size (total 
packet count of the observation time block) is unknown. We can compute the sampling 
probability at the beginning of a block by predicting the total packet count of a certain 
elephant flow. We employ an AR model for predicting the total packet count fhm of the hth 
block of elephant flow f, as compared to other time series models, since it is easier to 
understand and computationally more efficient. In particular, using the AR model, the 
model parameters can be obtained by solving a set of simple linear equations, making it 
suitable for online implementation. 
We will now briefly describe how the total packet count fhm  of the hth block of elephant 
flow f can be estimated, based on the past packet counts using the AR(u) model, where u is 
the lag length. Using the AR(u) model, fhm can be expressed as 
1
u
f f
i hh h i
i
m a m e

   
where ia , i=1, …, u, are the model parameters, and he is the uncorrelated error (which we 
refer to as the prediction error). 
The model parameters ia , i=1, …, u, can be determined by solving a set of linear equations in 
terms of v past values of fim ’s, where v≥1 is a configurable parameter independent of u, and 
is typically referred to as the memory size. 
Let ˆ fhm denote the predicted packet count of the hth block of elephant flow f. Using the 
AR(u) prediction model, we have 
1
ˆ
u
f f
ih h i
i
m a m 

 . 
Using the AR prediction model, at the end of each block, the model parameters ( ia ) are 
computed. The complexity of the AR prediction model parameter computation is only O(v) 
where v is the memory size.  
The predicted ˆ fhm is then compared with the actual value of the sample 
f
hm . A set of rules is 
applied to adjust the current sampling count, ∆Ccurr.=c(h) c(h1), to a new value, ∆Cnew, 
which is used to adjust the sampling count to compare the rate of change in the predicted 
sample value, 1ˆ
f f
h hm m  , to the actual rate of change, 1f fh hm m  . The ratio between the two 
rates is defined as R, where 
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R
m m


  . 
The value of R will be equal to 1 when the predicted behavior is same as the observed 
behavior. We define a range of values 1MIN MAXR R  , such that 
if MINR R , that is .New CurrC C   , then 
.( )New CurrC R C     . 
If MIN MAXR R R  , then 
.2New CurrC C    
If MAXR R , that is .New CurrC C   , then 
.(1 )New CurrC R C      . 
Otherwise, 
.2undefined New CurrR C C    
4.1.3 FPGA implementation 
HSTCP is built on the Avnet Virtex-II Pro Development Board, and its architecture 
satisfies the constraints of the Avnet board while efficiently integrating the components of 
a gigabit Ethernet network interface. The MAC unit, DMA unit, inter-FPGA bridge, 
hardware event management unit, and PCI interface were custom designed for HSTCP. 
The remaining components were provided by Xilinx and used with little or no 
modification. Both the MAC unit and the PCI interface are built around low-level 
interfaces provided by Xilinx; however, those units are still mostly custom logic to 
integrate them into the rest of the system and to provide flexible software control over the 
hardware functionality. 
The Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA on the Avnet development board contains most of the NIC 
logic, including the PowerPC processors, on-chip memories, MAC controller, DMA unit 
front-end, and DDR memory controller. The smaller Spartan-IIE FPGA contains the PCI 
controller, the back-end DMA controller, and a SRAM memory controller. The SDRAM, 
although connected to a shared data bus between the Spartan and Virtex FPGAs, was not 
used because the entire bus bandwidth was needed to efficiently use the PCI interface. 
To save development time, prebuilt Xilinx cores were used for several of the hardware 
modules, including the PCI interface, DDR controller, and a low-level MAC. However, these 
cores cannot be connected directly to form a working NIC. For example, although Xilinx 
provides a PCI core, it must be wrapped within a custom DMA unit to allow the PowerPC 
to initiate and manage high-performance burst transfers to/from the host system across the 
FPGA bridge. Similarly, although Xilinx provides a low-level MAC core, it must be outfitted 
with an advanced descriptor-based control system, data buffers, and a DMA unit to transfer 
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packet data between NIC memory and the PHY. Finally, the DDR controller required 
modifications to function in this specific development board with its unique wiring. 
The processors, memories, and hardware units are interconnected on the Virtex FPGA by a 
processor local bus (PLB). The PLB is a high-performance memory-mapped 100-MHz 64-bit-
wide split-transaction bus that can provide a maximum theoretical bandwidth of 12.5 
Gbits/s in a full duplex mode. The PLB allows for burst transmissions of up to 128 bytes in a 
single operation, which is used by the DMA and MAC units to improve memory access 
efficiency. 
Also attached to the PLB is a small memory-mapped control module used to route 
descriptors to or from the MAC and DMA hardware assist units. This module also provides 
a central location for hardware counters, event thresholds, and other low-level control 
functions. By attaching this central control unit to the PLB, either PowerPC processor can 
manipulate these important NIC functions. The control unit takes 18 PowerPC cycles to read 
and 12 cycles to write a 32-bit word, primarily due to bus arbitration delays. 
4.2 Experiment 
We evaluated HSTCP using a synthetic dataset that was generated by combining the data 
from the 1999 DARPA intrusion detection project and 2000 DARPA “Scenario Datasets” that 
have been crafted to provide examples of multiple component attack scenarios instead of the 
atomic attacks as found in past evaluations [24] and Münchner Wissenschaftsnetz (MWN), 
Germany. The MWN provides Internet connectivity to two major universities and a number 
of research institutes. Overall, the network contains about 50,000 individual hosts and 65,000 
registered users. The trace “mwn-cs-full” that we analyzed is a 2-h trace including the full 
payload of all packets to/from one of the CS departments in MWN, with some high-volume 
servers excluded.  
The 1999 DARPA dataset that we used consisted of 5 weeks of TCPdump data. Weeks 1 and 
3 have normal attack-free network traffic. Week 2 consists of network traffic with labeled 
attacks, while weeks 4 and 5 contain 201 instances of 58 different attacks, 177 of which are 
visible in the TCPdump data. The 2000 DARPA dataset includes two recently created 
scenario datasets that address the needs of mid-level correlation systems. Each includes 
several hours of background traffic and a complete attack scenario. Attacks and background 
traffic were run on the same testbed used in the 1999 evaluation, but with the addition of a 
commercial off-the-shelf firewall and demilitarized zone (DMZ) network separating the 
Internal and Internet networks and a Solaris 2.7 victim host. 
The experimental evaluation of HSTCP has been divided into three steps. In section 4.1, we 
evaluate the performance of the sampling algorithm and compare its performance with the 
stratified random sampling algorithm. Then in section 4.2 we evaluate the performance of 
HSTCP for intrusion detection/prevention. 
4.2.1 Evaluation of the sampling algorithm 
Experiments were conducted to compare and evaluate the performance of the proposed 
adaptive sampling algorithm with the stratified random sampling algorithm. 
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In 1994, Leland et al. showed that the Ethernet traffic consisted of slowly decaying packet 
count bursts across all time scales. Time series that consist of such a pattern are said to 
exhibit the property of long-range dependence and are termed as “self-similar.” Similar self-
similar behavior has also been observed in wide-area Internet traffic by other researchers . 
One important characteristic of a self-similar process is that its degree of self-similarity can 
be expressed with a single parameter, namely the Hurst parameter which can be derived 
from the rescaled adjusted range (R/S) statistic. It is defined as follows. 
For a given set of observations X1, X2, …, Xn with a sample mean ( )X n and sample variance 
2( )S n , the rescaled adjusted range or the R/S statistic is given by  
( ) / ( )R n S n   1 2 1 21 / ( ) max(0, , ,..., ) min(0, , ,..., )n nS n W W W W W W , with  
1 2( ) ( )k kW X X X kX n    , k=1, 2, …, n. Hurst (1955) found that many naturally 
occurring time series appear to be well represented by the relation   4( ) / ( ) HE R n S n n฀ , as 
n  , with Hurst Parameter H “typically” about 0.73. On the other hand, if the 
observations Xk come from a short-range dependent model, then Mandelbrot and Van Ness 
(1968) showed that   0.55( ) / ( )E R n S n n฀ , as n  . This discrepancy is generally referred 
to as the Hurst effect or Hurst phenomenon.  
It is very important whether the traffic data sampled by the proposed sampling scheme 
retains the self-similar property for various anomaly detection techniques, which may 
directly affect the accuracy and efficiency of detection. So we verify this based on two 
different parameters: the mean of the packet count and the Hurst parameter. The peak-to-
mean ratio (PMR) can be used as an indicator of traffic burstiness. The PMR is calculated 
by comparing the peak value of the measure entity with the average value from the 
population. However, this statistic is heavily dependent on the size of the intervals, and 
therefore may or may not represent the actual traffic characteristic. A more accurate 
indicator of traffic burstiness is given by the Hurst parameter. The Hurst parameter (H) is 
a measure of the degree of self-similarity. In this paper we use the R/S statistical test to 
obtain an estimate for the Hurst parameter. We run the test on both the original and the 
sampled data. 
In our sampling scheme, simple random sampling is conducted in every time block (strata) 
and this refers to stratified random sampling. 
In Figures 3 and 4, we show the average sampling error for the Hurst parameter and the 
sample mean, respectively. As one can see in Figure 13, the stratified random sampling 
algorithm resulted in a higher average percent error for the Hurst parameter when 
compared to adaptive sampling. This could be the result of missing data spread out over a 
number of sampling intervals. In Figure 14, the average percentage error for the mean 
statistic was marginally lower for our sampling algorithm when compared with the 
stratified random sampling algorithm, albeit the difference was insignificant. One possible 
reason for this marginal difference is the inherent randomness nature of stratified random 
sampling algorithm—i.e., the weighted mean packets are nicely sampled randomly, which 
results in good estimation of mean. 
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Fig. 13. Average percentage error for the Hurst parameter. 
 
Fig. 14. Average percentage error for the mean statistic. 
4.2.2 Evaluation of the platform for intrusion detection/prevention 
The IXIA1600T (a special network test facility of IXIA Crop) is used to transmit the synthetic 
dataset in 1000M Ethernet. The ISS RealSecure gigabit network is selected to detect attacks 
(intrusions), and HSTCP is used for collecting network traffic for it. As the first commercial 
IDS, RealSecure has been playing an important role in this field, and it provides network 
intrusion detection and response capabilities that monitor the gigabit network. 
The ROC (receiver operating characteristic) technique is used to evaluate the detection effect 
of ISS RealSecure. The ROC approach analyzes the tradeoff between false alarm and 
detection rates for detection systems. It was originally developed in the field of signal 
detection. More recently, it has become the standard approach to evaluate IDSs. In this 
paper, we mainly take into account the detection rates of RealSecure when its false alarm 
rate is under 0.2. Too many false alarms will make administrators consume unnecessary 
time and energy analyzing these alarms, which compromises the usability and validity. 
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In Figure 15, we can see that HSTCP was able to cope with the 1-Gbps network traffic, and 
elephant flow sampling was not initiated. The detection rates of RealSecure remarkably 
increased during initial phases, and then tended to be stable.  
 
Fig. 15. The ROC curves at 1-Gbps speed. 
To evaluate the performance of HSTCP for intrusion detection in the high-speed network, 
we used IXIA1600T to transmit the synthetic dataset at a 10-Gbps speed. Under this 
circumstance, HSTCP could not capture the whole traffic and tended to drop packets. In 
Figure16, we can see that the detection rates sharply decline without sampling. While 
HSTCP initiated elephant flow sampling methods to cope with the network traffic, 
RealSecure could still make response to the high-speed traffic. With the increase in false 
alarm rates, detection rates remained high and stable.  
 
Fig. 16. The ROC curves at a 10-Gbps speed. 
We compared the performance of the adaptive sampling technique and the random sampling 
technique. As expected, the adaptive sampling technique showed superior performance. 
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4.3 Summary 
In this subsection, we have presented a uniform high-speed traffic collection platform for 
intrusion detection/prevention based on sampling on FPGAs—called HSTCP—that has the 
ability to cope with very high speed network traffic (even Tbps). By employing complete 
mice flows’ capture and adaptive elephant flow sampling, HSTCP effectively reduces the 
volume of network traffic for intrusion detection/prevention without losing its intrinsic 
characteristics. In addition, HSTCP provides a flexible and scalable platform for network 
IDSs/IPSs faced to the challenge of future high-speed networks. 
5. The research of trusted communication protocol for intrustion prevention 
system 
5.1 IPS trusted communication mechanism 
A trusted communication mechanism proposed in this chapter applied to the correlation 
between firewall and IDS in a distributed intrusion prevention system. It is mainly based on 
middleware technology and security Protocol standard techniques. And the middleware 
technology is CORBA. If CORBA underlies network layer, it may encapsulate the 
underlying unit; which may make the application transparent to the up-layer. In this paper, 
TLS is applied to the trusted data transmission between firewall and IDS. 
5.2 The design of IPS trusted communication protocol 
The design of the mechanism of trusted data communication is illustrated by figure 17: 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. The mechanism of trusted communication for IPS  
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Application Layer 
The application layer mainly refers to Client and Server; in this paper it represents firewall 
and IDS. During the transmission, both of the firewall and IDS can be client or server. 
Firewall and IDS system are all in the network layer. Firewall provides the data source and a 
place to process the final data while IDS is responsible for receiving data request from 
firewall and analyzing them, and then return the processed results to the firewall. 
XML parsing layer 
This layer primarily encapsulates and analyzes the communicated data. 
Message transaction layer 
In this paper, a security protocol called TLS (Transport Layer Security) applied to 
supporting the security and reliability for data communicate among each other. It also may 
protect the privacy of the applications and users for network communication. When server 
and client are communicated, TLS could make sure important messages won’t be sniffered 
or stolen by the third party. It is a successor protocol followed by SSL. 
CORBA security service 
CORBA security service (CORBASec) is an important public object service in CORBA. It 
constructs secure language environment between client objects and service objects, and also 
provides better security service [10]. 
5.3 Design of data exchange format based on XML 
In a distributed intrusion prevention system, data filter module is composed of a firewall 
and other components. Network data processing module generally refers to IDS. In this 
paper, data transmitted between firewall and IDS are classified into four categories: event 
data, rule data, analysis result data and actions response data, and it is referred to the 
function units in CIDF framework [11]. 
The relationship among above data: Data generated by the firewall with network packets 
filtered called event data. Whether the event described is an intrusion event, it depends on 
the match or analysis of IDS based rule data. If it was a real intrusion event, then generated 
the analysis result data. The firewall will make a response to the analysis result data based 
on the corresponding strategies, and generates action response data.  
Design of event data  
Data filtered original network packets by firewall according to security strategy is event 
data. Therefore, this kind of data must contain the complete description of network original 
data that IDS can detect or analyze by those matching information in rules. In addition, it 
needs to contain the firewall name and the time of event happened. The reason of including 
firewall name is that more firewalls may be deployed in network. When detecting the 
network data, more than one firewall will find the same event, so we need to distinguish 
and analyze. In some cases, IDS need to detect what happened during some phases and then 
ensure whether any intrusions had happened, so the data type also contains the time of 
event happened. At last, to support data expansion, we need additional data applied to 
describing some additional description in event data, and it can be used as a reserved 
interface. The illustration of event data is as follows: 
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Fig. 18. The design of event data 
 
Fig. 19. The design of rule data 
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The XML DTD of event data is provided in details as follows, but other types are ignored. 
Design of rule data  
According to snort rules, the rule data divided into two logic parts: Rule header and rule 
options. The rule header contains rule actions, protocols, source and destination IP Address 
and mask, source or destination ports and some direction operators. The rule option 
contains some alert messages and the main parts of checked packets; it includes the 
characteristics and the priority. And the part of characteristics should be described by one or 
more keywords. Same as the event data, rule data also need contain the reserved interface 
applied to the expansion of rule data, and then put them into rule options. The design of 
rule data is shown in Figure.3. 
Design of analysis results data 
To analyze the data delivered to IDS and the rule data of IDS then get the analysis results 
data. After the detection analysis by IDS, the event can be classified into three categories: 
a malicious attacked event, a security event being suspected but not confirmed and 
normal network traffic. To the malicious attacks event, we use the obstructive response 
methods and record this event; it needs some alert response methods to those being 
suspected but not confirmed security events. Just writing down the key information to the 
normal network traffic is enough. However, none of these will be directly solved in IDS. 
IDS will put the analysis results data through the central control module and match it, 
then feedback to firewall if it was allowed, and firewall will tackle them according to the 
response actions. So the analysis results data should describe the event type, event 
processing action, time of the event, which IDS dealt with the event and so on. If it was 
the malicious or suspected event, we also need to describe the name of event, the source 
of event, the target of event, when attack happened and how it did affect the system. The 
same as the first two data structure, we also need to give the analysis results data a 
reserved interface which is called expansion data. The design of analysis results data is 
shown in Figure.20. 
Design of action response data  
According to response actions, firewall deal with the results data detected by IDS and gets 
the action response data. During this, the normal network traffic don’t need to be 
recorded, whereas put the malicious or suspected events and corresponding processing 
actions into the record, thus the action response data only defined to IDS. So the action 
response data should present which firewall has been responded to the analysis data? 
What is attack event called?  What is the source from? What is the target? When has it 
happened? And how does it compromise the system? All of these relate to the 
corresponding attack events in the analysis result events. These records used to keep the 
respond data integrity. The action response data should also record the final processing 
results analyzed by firewall to the results data, which is called response action. In 
addition, the receiver should be provided either. At last, including the extended data and 
the implementation of data extended. The design of action response data is shown in 
Figure.21. 
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Fig. 20. The design of analysis results data 
5.4 Related works 
IDXP (Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol) is an application layer protocol, which is 
applied to the data exchange among intrusion detection entities (Feinstein & Matthews, 
2007), and it may support the transformation of the IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message 
Exchange Format) message, unstructured text and binary dataset (Debar et al., 2007). Again, 
it has the security characteristics of bidirectional authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
based on connection-oriented protocols. However, IDXP and IDMEF are simply data 
exchange protocols, and they aren’t adaptive to other correlation schemes. 
IAP (Intrusion Alert Protocol)[9] is a transport protocol applied to the alert data of intrusion 
detection, which is based on TCP protocol and TLS protocol used for the secure data 
transmission (Gupta et al., 2001). Alert data is described in XML, and it conforms to the 
format specification of IDMEF. 
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Fig. 21. The design drawing of action response data 
IPIEP (Intrusion Protection Interaction Exchange Protocol) is an application layer protocol 
applied to the definition of exchange rules for correlation messages, while IPIMEF (Intrusion 
Protection Interaction Message Exchange Format) provides the definition of data format for 
message, and they don’t have corresponding dependent relationship. 
Above all, all of these related works don’t provide the support to the trusted communication 
transmission between data filter module and network data process module in a distributed 
intrusion prevention system. 
5.5 Summary 
The main contribution of this subsection is to provide a trusted communication protocol 
between data filter module and network data processing module in a distributed IPS. The 
transmit data can be classified into four categories with XML technology defined 
respectively, and XML DTD description language is applied to the definition of these four 
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data formats, and then a data trusted communication mechanism is provided, which 
divided into three layers: application layer, XML parsing layer and message transaction 
layer. CORBA technology is applied to solving the heterogeneous platform and load-
balancing problems. TLS security protocol standard is to ensure the integrity and security 
during data transmission. The trusted communicated protocol also can be adaptive to 
network security products and network management equipments, and it contributes to 
security data fusion and detecting sophisticated distributed network attacks. 
6. Conclusion 
With the rapid development and comprehensive application of network technology, 
Internet significantly contributes to the development of the human society. Meanwhile, 
network security problems gradually appear serious. Traditional firewall technologies can’t 
provide sufficient security protection against various attacks and intrusions, while intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) are faced with compromise between false alarms and false positives, 
so intrusion prevention system (IPS) come into being. IPS may block malicious attack traffic 
before corresponding intrusions cause more severe damage other than simply generate 
intrusion alarms. 
In this chaper, we investigate intrusion detection and intrusion prevention in high speed 
network and the main research work is as follows:  
1. Based on the investigation on the recent trends of network security techniques, such as 
firewall and IDS, we propose a intrusion prevention scheme based on the correlation 
between IDS and firewall. This scheme complements the fundamental flaws of IDS and 
firewall, and it may provide real-time, active prevention and attempts to stop attacks, 
which contributes to normal transmission of legal network traffic. In this paper, we 
present the design and implementation of a prototype system of network IPS —— 
DXIPS, based on the correlation between Snort_inline and Netfilter configured by 
IPtables. The hierarchical architecture of this system includes intrusion prevention 
layer, server layer and control layer, in which intrusion prevention layer monitors the 
traversing traffic and conducts intrusion detection and prevention; server layer collects 
log data and translate them into readable formats; control layer is administrational 
console and perform data display. The system is design with modularization, which 
includes intrusion prevention module, log recording module, central control module 
and communication module, and the concrete implementations of these modules are 
presented. The deployment policies are discussed according to various applications 
environment. Netfilter is a built-in firewall in the kernel of Linux, which belongs to the 
latest fifth generation firewall. It has the capability to directly filter malicious packets in 
the TCP/IP stack in kernel, which improves the response performance. What’s more, 
DXIPS provides better scalability according to various applications environment. 
2. Data collection mechanism is a key factor that affects the performance of IDS/IPS. The 
most current products execute per-packet detection. However, with the development 
and widespread of high speed networking technique, the application of IDS/IPS has 
been faced with serious challenges. In this paper, the sampling technique in statistics is 
introduced into the procedure of data collection for IDS/IPS, and the new data 
collection module based on sampling is proposed. Three typical sampling strategies, 
such as systematic sampling, Poisson sampling and stratified sampling, are applied to 
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network traffic collection. The packet length and type serve as the measure of anomaly 
detection, and simulation results show that the sample traffic is still characterized as the 
whole network traffic, and it may provide efficient data source for anomaly detection 
with the lower overhead. In a short, this method exceedingly strengthens the processing 
performance of IDS/IPS by the means of replacing dropping packets passively with 
sampling packets actively with the minor degradation of detection rates, and may 
improve resistant to Denial of Service attacks. 
3. With the ever increasing deployment and usage of gigabit networks, traditional 
networks Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) have not scaled 
accordingly. More recently, researchers have been looking at hardware based solutions 
that use FPGA’s to assist network IDSs/IPSs, and some proposed systems have been 
developed that can be scaled to achieve a high speed over 10Gbps. However, these 
solutions available have inherent limitations and unable to be applied to future high 
speed network (Tbps). In this paper, we present a scalable traffic sampling platform for 
intrusion detection/prevention on FPGA, called STAMP. The methodology is when the 
proposed platform is unable to capture the whole network traffic; it will initiate 
elephant flow sampling other than merely randomly dropping packets. Meanwhile, 
sampling rate is adaptive to the traffic load of elephant flow. All the captured packets 
are forward from STAMP to IDS via PCI bus. The noteworthy features of STAMP 
include: it takes the self similarity of network traffic into account with the attempts to 
collect malicious traffic, and improve the efficiency of network traffic sampling for 
IDS/IPS; it employs adaptive elephant flow sampling (AEFS) to retain inherent 
characteristics of network traffic, which contributes to anomaly detection; it provides a 
flexible and scalable platform for network IDSs/IPSs that will be faced the challenge of 
future high-speed network. 
4. To achieve the secure and reliable transmission for the interactive data between IDS and 
firewall, the concept of trusted communication is introduced in this paper. We give the 
design and implementation of a trusted communication protocol based on XML. The 
design and implementation of trusted communication mechanism between firewall and 
IDS is presented considering each functional unit of common intrusion detection 
framework. The CORBA middleware is applied to data transmission, and TLS secure 
protocol is applied to trusted transmission between IDS and firewall. The hierarchical 
architecture of this protocol includes application layer, XML resolution layer and message 
transaction layer, in which application layer consists of client and server used to capture 
and analyze packets; XML resolution layer translates the data into uniform XML format 
and provide the base for data exchange; message transaction layer employs TLS security 
protocol to achieve secure and trusted communication. The data type between IDS and 
firewall of the proposed prototype system is composed of event data, rule data, analysis 
result data and response action data, and the concrete descriptions of these data based on 
XML DTD are also provided. The proposed trusted communication protocol has the 
scalability to support various network security products (such as firewall, IDS, IPS, etc.) 
and management facilities, and may contribute to the data fusion of these facilities and 
detect sophisticated distributed network attacks. 
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